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Since Coase (1937), most economists believe that the main difference between markets and 
firms is that firms allocate resources by means of authority, whereas markets use the price 
mechanism (see nonetheless Alchian and Demsetz's, 1972 criticism; see also Hart's, 1989 
survey for a discussion). However, in the most basic economic environment possible, one with 
symmetric information and complete contracting, the allocation of power is irrelevant from 
the point of view of efficiency, although it has distributional effects. Hence, two important 
questions remain unanswered within that framework: first of all, who should have more power 
in a firm? And secondly: what mechanisms should a firm design to encourage an efficient use 
of power? In contrast, it is common for managers to think of power, authority, leadership, 
lobbying, or employee participation as important determinants of firm performance. For 
example, in recent years managers have become more and more interested in creating more 
participative workplaces -environments where employees do not receive very restrictive 
orders and are encouraged to make suggestions (e.g. Appelbaum and Batt, 1994; IPD, 
1995). Other examples would illustrate the same point: often overlooked by economists, the 
role of power is viewed by managers as crucial. 
With the development of models of asymmetric information on one hand and incomplete 
contracting on the other, economists have started to be able to address some of these issues. 
Since its early developments, principal-agent theory has stressed that asymmetries of infor-
mation generate power. On one hand, subordinates inevitably acquire private information 
by performing tasks different from their managers', and can use that information to pursue 
their own goals. On the other hand, subordinates' actions are not always perfectly observ-
able. In one way or the other, informational asymmetries help to explain why in the minds of 
managers power is so closely related to efficiency: for example, allowing too much discretion 
to one's subordinates can easily lead to decisions that are wasteful from the point of view 
of the firm -subordinates using their power to their own advantage. This may explain why 
some organizations, trying to restrict such inefficiencies, impos~ bureaucratic constraints. 
On the other hand, there are also situations where managers can greatly benefit from their 
subordinates' better information if they allow them to participate in the decision-making 
process. Both possibilities give an idea of how the exercise of authority affects efficiency. As 
far as the first question -how power should be allocated- is concerned, most of the work 
has been done in an incomplete contracting framework. Grossman and Hart's (1986) basic 
argument, on which this literature has developed, was that when parties sign a contract the 
inability to perfectly describe all future contingencies would lead to contract renegotiation. 
Hence, a formal contract is often less important than the allocation of power which is implicit 
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in it, i. e. the underlying statement about who has a right to decide when unforeseen events 
occur. In such events, the party with power to decide behaves opportunistically, and this 
affects the value of the relationship: after the contract is signed and before any unforeseen 
event has taken place, the party with less power tends to invest less in the relationship, 
expecting that in some states of the world the investment is going to be used by the other 
part to her own advantage. 
In this paper I present, discuss and compare the insights that various models have pro-
duced regarding the economic role of power in organizations. The common characteristic of 
most of the papers I review is that power is regarded as an instrument to align the incentives 
of employees with those of the organization (see nevertheless section 5.1 for a different view): 
more powerful employees tend to behave in the firm's best interest and make their subor-
dinates behave in that way too. However, the models differ because they focus on different 
reasons why incentives cannot be easily aligned to begin with. The first reason is adverse 
selection: different employees have access to different information, and tend to use their pri-
vate information to their own benefit. As a consequence, the firm faces a trade-off between 
limiting employee discretion in order to prevent the use of private information for harmful 
purposes; and giving discretion to employees and allowing them to capture informational 
rents. Section 4.2 contains a discussion of this issue. A second reason why it is not easy to 
align objectives within the organization is that employees are unable to commit to actions 
that they had previously agreed on. This might be because the actions are not observable 
or not verifiable. The role of power in that case is analyzed in sections 3.4, 4 and 5. Finally, 
the third reason is contract incompleteness: it is too costly to write a contract which would 
completely align all incentives. I analyze the role that power can play in this case in sections 
3.1, 3.2 and 3.3. 
The paper begins in section 2 with a brief discussion of the concept of;'power" or "author-
ity" that is used in the various approaches. Although there are many benefits from aligning 
the employees' objectives with the firm's (more cooperation between colleagues, more effort, 
or more initiative, to name only a few), many economists have emphasized the effect on the 
accumulation of firm-specific human capital. Hence, I devote section 3 to analyze how the 
allocation of power may be used to encourage such investments. Throughout that section, I 
assume that power can be measured in a simple way and that, as a consequence, the firm can 
offer a simple contract where different employees are given different levels of power. After 
that, I point out that power is not easily measured, that in practice the firm has to design 
a combination of decision rights for each employee, and that this design raises many issues. 
Thus, in sections 4 and 5 I discuss some of the decisions that the firm has to make in this 
direction, such as how many subordinates each manager should have; whether subordinates 
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should be allowed to communicate with each other; or whether managers should take their 
subordinates' suggestions into account. 
2 What is power? 
2.1 The Sources of Power 
Most economic models define power as the ability of a person to affect the decisions of the 
organization he belongs to. However, this general definition is consistent with many different 
views on what power really is. In fact, there is not much agreement about what the sources 
of power are. In this section I introduce the different views, which I discuss in the remaining 
sections. 
The idea that comes most readily to mind is that a powerful employee is an employee 
with many subordinates. The image of a powerful manager is that of a person at the top of 
a large hierarchy. In a hierarchical organization, managerial decisions have a large influence 
on the firm because high-ranked managers can transmit orders to many employees, whereas 
employees at low positions can affect firm performance only through what they (and perhaps 
a small group of immediate subordinates) do. However, high positions in a company provide 
many rights, and the right of command is not the only one. Thus, higher managers have also a 
right to make more important productive decisions, such as investments in physical capital, 
or development of new products or processes. While such decisions evidently require the 
participation of many other employees, the number of employees involved is not determinant: 
after all, there are purely technological reasons why some units of an organization are more 
labor-intensive than others. And labor intensity is not always correlated with the importance 
of the activity that a department carries out in a company: in fact, lab or-intensive units 
oftentimes perform functions whose value to the firm is relatively small. Finally, a third 
view is that some employees have power simply because they have valuable information, or 
because their human capital is very scarce in the organization. Employees who do not have 
many subordinates under their command can nonetheless have valuable private information 
and use it to their own interest; and some employees who formally do not have a lot of power 
in the firm are sometimes very influential because they have well-developed skills that other 
employees lack (e.g. Dalton, 1959). 
As I mentioned before, in order to clarify how different models have analyzed the role of 
power in the firm it will be useful to distinguish between two approaches: the incomplete 
contracting approach (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995), and the 
asymmetric information (principal-agent) approach. The incomplete contracting approach 
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stresses that it is too costly or impossible to describe all possible future contingencies when 
a contract is written. For example, a new technology, which was unknown when the contract 
was signed, might be discovered and might alter the objectives of the parties, who in that 
case will want to renegotiate the initial contract. Anticipating this, the parties to a contract 
consider it not only as a statement of actions to be undertaken in the future, but also as a 
fall-back option in case a future renegotiation does not succeed. Moreover, because it is likely 
that a renegotiation will take place, the initial contract always specifies who has a right to 
decide in case of an unforeseen contingency (in many cases the legal system already specifies 
this and nothing needs to be written in the contract). Thus, in the incomplete contracting 
literature power is defined as a residual decision right: what makes a party powerful is being 
able to decide in the event of an unexpected contingency. 
The principal-agent approach considers that informational asymmetries are inherent to 
any relationship of power. The point of view here is that an allocation of power not only 
determines what each person has a right to decide, but also what each person learns and 
observes. Thus, a manager can decide what his subordinates should do when an event which 
was not explicitly considered in the contract takes place, as the incomplete contracting 
literature points out. But this right is usually limited in two ways: first of all, it is costly 
for him to monitor that his subordinates do exactly what they have been asked to do; 
and secondly, his subordinates may have information that he needs in order to make the 
optimal decision. As a consequence, there is a tension between the legal right of command 
of a manager and the subordinates' power to use their private information or the lack of 
observability to satisfy their own objectives. 
Each approach answers a different question. Contract incompleteness gives an expla-
nation for why the allocation of power affects efficiency. For example, consider a contract 
signed between an employee and his employer. Suppose that in order to maximize the value 
of the (employer-employee) match each party would have to make relationship-specific in-
vestments. If it is not possible to write a complete contract, the employee might underinvest 
for fear that if something unexpected happens the employer will take a decision to her own 
advantage and reduce the gains from his investment. If complete contracts were possible, 
the parties would be able to write a clause making sure that the employer does not engage 
in opportunistic behavior. On the other hand, the incomplete contracting literature does 
not explain how power is exercised. The assumption that a contract can specify any division 
of power is stronger than it seems, because even if a manager is formally entitled to give 
orders, his subordinates may undermine this right by using their private information. In 
fact, in the daily operation of a firm the design of efficient mechanisms to exercise power and 
to organize communication between different hierarchical levels is a more common concern 
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than the allocation of power, which is changed only occasionally. This concern shows that 
the question of how power should be exercised does not have a trivial answer. 
2.2 Power and Authority 
Traditionally, the role of power in organizations has been studied by sociologists. In fact, 
the definition of power as the ability to affect the decisions of the organization is the one 
that sociologists most often use. However, the sodologicalliterature makes finer distinctions 
between various terms which would generally conform to the above general definition. Thus, 
it is usual to distinguish between power and authority (e.g. Abercrombie et al., 1994). The 
term power is used to refer to situations where there is a conflict of interest between members 
of the organization: in such a context, a manager exercises power when he has a right to have 
his objectives prevail despite his subordinate's preferences. On the other hand, the manager 
has authority over his subordinate when the latter voluntarily accepts her manager's decision. 
In the economics literature, most authors use power and authority interchangeably to 
refer to what sociologists would call "power". Usually, the models of incomplete contracts 
use the word "power", while principal-agent models refer to "authority", but in most cases 
there is no difference of meaning: both are meant to refer to a relationship where a party 
imposes his will on another party. There are however two exceptions. One is Aghion and 
Tirole (1997), whose notions of formal and real authority bear a close resemblance with the 
sociological definitions of power and authority (respectively). The other one is Hermalin 
(1997), whose model of "leadership" precisely takes into account that a leader draws volun-
tary support from his subordinates. This concept of leadership coincides with what many 
sociologists would call authority. Throughout the paper, I keep my terminology as close to 
that of the literature as possible, and unless otherwise specified I use power and authority 
as synonyms. 
3 Allocation of Power and Firm-Specific Human Cap-
ital Acquisition 
3.1 Power as a Residual Right of Control 
The idea that power motivates employees to invest in firm-specific human capital was first 
introduced by Hart and Moore (1990). Define a firm as a set of employees, denoted by S, 
and a set of nonhuman assets, A. Suppose the owner wishes to distribute power among 
the employees in a way that maximizes the value of the firm. Suppose that initially a 
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contract is signed with all employees which specifies what actions should be undertaken by 
each employee in various circumstances. Suppose however that all future states of the world 
cannot be predicted in this contract, and as a consequence the owner has to decide what 
employees are going to have the right to decide in such events. The owner distributes power 
by giving to each employee a right of control over a subset of assets. Thus the allocation of 
control is a function A = a(8) where A ~ A and 8 ~ S. Finally, suppose that after having 
signed the initial contract (which includes the allocation of power) and before any future 
uncertainty has been resolved employees can undertake investments in firm-specific human 
capital. This means that an employee's investment yields a return only if the employee 
remains in the firm (the investment is in human capital) and the asset is controlled by the 
firm (the investment is asset-specific). Let Xi denote employee i's investment, and assume 
that the cost of the investment is simply Xi. Hence, we may summarize the timing as follows: 
• t = 0: the owner distributes the rights of control (that is, chooses the function a) and 
the employees choose noncooperatively their investment levels . 
• t = 1: production takes place and the surplus is shared by the employees through 
cooperative bargaining. 
The allocation of control determines the ex-post division of surplus because an employee 
controlling an asset can gain a larger share of the surplus in the bargaining process by 
threatening to exclude other employees from using the asset. To formalize the bargaining 
process, let v(8, a(8)lx) denote the maximum surplus that a coalition 8 of employees can 
get under the control structure a, given the vector of investments x. Following Hart and 
Moore (1990), we assume that v(.) is superadditive in 8 and A: for all subsets 8' ~ 8 and 
A' ~ A, v(8, Alx) ~ v(8', A'lx) + v(8 - 8', A - A'lx). As a consequence, ex post surplus is 
maximized when the agents form the grand coalition S with assets A. We also assume that 
agent i's ex post reward is given by his Shapley value 
where 
Bi(alx) = L p(8)[v(8,a(8)lx) - v(8 - {i},a(8 - {i})lx)] 
SliES 
p(8) = (s - 1)!(~ - s)! 
~! 
and s = 181, ~ = ISI. The Shapley value of agent i in the grand coalition is the average of 
his marginal contributions to all the possible coalitions he could belong to. This is also a 
standard assumption of the incomplete contracting literature. 
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A few simple examples illustrate the main insights of the model. 
Example 1 Assume that: 
• S = {1,2} and A = {a}; 
• Only agent 1 can invest (X2 = 0), and his investment generates a surplus R(XI); 
• Any agent can be allowed to control the asset. 
In this case, there are three possible control structures: one where agent 1 controls the 
asset, another one where agent 2 does, and a third one where both do. To make notation 
less heavy, I denote these control structures by Cl, C2, and C12 respectively. Thus Cl 
corresponds to the case where a(.) takes the following form: 
a({l}) = a({1,2}) = {a}, 
a({2}) =0. 
Giving control to agent 1 is equivalent to placing him in a managerial position, while 
leaving agent 2 as his subordinate, because agent 1 can determine the use that is given to 
the asset and, in particular, can exclude agent 2 from working with it (he can fire him). 
Let R(XI) denote the surplus generated by the asset when agent l's investment in human 
capital is applied to it. Under Cl, the values of the different coalitions are v( {1,2}, {a }IXI) = 
R(XI) - Xl, v( {I}, {a }IXI) = R(XI) - Xl, and v( {2}, 01xI) = o. As a consequence, when 1 
controls the asset his payoff function is 
On the contrary, under agent 2 control the values of the coalitions are v( {I, 2}, {a }IXI) = 
R(XI) - Xl, v( {I }IXI) = -Xl, and v( {2}lxI) = 0 and therefore agent l's payoff is 
Note a few interesting things. First of all, agent 1 has more incentives to invest in firm-
specific human capital when he controls the asset than when he does not. Hence, if the 
firm is only concerned about l's investment decision, all the power (i. e. the control over the 
asset) should be given to 1. Intuitively, if the firm gave control to 2, his ability to exclude 
agent 1 from using the asset would be ''wasted'': if the firm wants 1 to invest, there is no 
reason why it should make it difficult for him to use the asset. More generally, Hart and 
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Moore (1990) prove that if only one agent invests, then that agent should control all the 
assets. Secondly, note that agent 1 would still invest even if 2 controls the asset. This is so 
because Xl is an investment in human capital, and therefore 1 can always walk away with his 
investment and leave agent 2 with a lower surplus. If the investment was in physical capital, 
there would be no reason for 1 to invest when 2 controls the asset. Finally, suppose that 
both agents could make initial investments in specific human capital, which would generate 
a surplus R(XI' X2). Then the optimal division of power would depend on how the control 
of the asset affects the marginal return of each agent's investment. 
A more interesting insight of this model is that the control of nonhuman assets provides 
control over human assets. This is interesting because a priori one would think that the right 
to give orders to subordinates and the right to decide how to use the (nonhuman) assets of 
the firm are equally important components of power (see section 2). However, suppose the 
firm had no nonhuman assets. In the absence of slavery, it would not mean anything to say 
that 1 (or 2) has all the power. On the contrary, when the firm has nonhuman assets, the 
fact that 1 can control the assets gives him a legal way to threaten 2 who, as a consequence, 
chooses to act in 1 's interest. In this way, it means something to say that 1 has all the power. 
The following example illustrates this. 
Example 2 Assume that: 
• s = {1, 2, 3} and A = {a}; 
• Only agent 3 can invest (Xl = X2 = 0); 
• Only agents 1 or 2 can control the asset; 
• Only agent 1 considers 3's investment profitable. 
In this case, if agent 1 controls the asset, the values of the different coalitions are 
v( {1, 2, 3}, {a}lx3) = R(X3) - X3, v( {1, 3}, {a }IX3) = R(X3) - X3, v(S, a(S)lx3) = -X3 for 
any other coalition S c S such that 3 E S, and v(S, a(S)lx3) = 0 for any other coalition 
such that 3 t/:. S. This means that agent 3's investment yields a return only if both 3 and 1 
are in the firm and the firm controls the asset. Thus, under control structure Cl agent 3's 
Shapley value is 
On the other hand, under C2 (agent 2 controls the asset) the corresponding values of the 
coalitions are v({1,2,3}, {a}lx3) = R(X3), v(S,a(S)lx3) = -X3 for all other coalitions S c S 
9 
.' 
such that 3 E S, and v(S, a(S)lx3) = 0 for any other coalition such that 3 ~ S. Hence 
and agent 3 has less incentives to invest. In other words, an employee invests more when 
the manager who values that investment more controls the asset. 
Another interesting conclusion that this example illustrates is that it need not be optimal 
for the owner to give more power to the employees that make more valuable investments. 
Although this is the optimal allocation of power in example 1, example 2 shows that there 
are cases where some employees make very valuable investments but do not value them 
"enough" (from the point of view of the firm). In such cases, it might be optimal to give 
control to the employees that value the investments more, even if they are not the ones who 
invest. 
3.2 Power as Access to Critical Resources 
Hart and Moore's (1990) conclusions regarding how power should be allocated rely on the 
definition of power as a residual right of control. Rajan and Zingales (1998) have argued 
that it may be misleading to identify power with asset control, and to make their point, 
have shown that under realistic assumptions it is possible for an employee with more control 
rights to have less incentives. 
Re-consider example 1. We assumed there that v({l}, {a}lxI) = R(XI) -Xl' This means 
that if agent 2 abandoned the relationship, agent 1 would still be able to get the whole 
surplus. However, if 1 can get the same payoff from his investment independently of whether 
2 is or is not (i.e. v({l},{a}lxI) = v({1,2},{a}lxI)), then this means that his investment 
in human capital is not really relationship-specific. The investment is asset-specific, because 
only the agent who controls the asset benefits from it. But it is not relationship-specific: if it 
was, agent 1 would receive a lower payoff when agent 2 is out of the relationship than when 
he is in. To understand this, suppose that agent 1 's investment in human capital has an 
effect on the physical nature of the asset, a: for example, suppose that a is a large database 
of clients and agent 1 's investment consists in putting the database in a format that agent 
2 is comfortable to work with (this would enable agent 2, who has to use the database, to 
be more efficient). Suppose that before the database is customized any potential employee 
would be able to consult it at a reasonable speed. Customization enables agent 2 to consult 
it at a higher speed, but reduces the speed at which any other potential employee would be 
able to consult it. Hence if agent 2 leaves after l's investment has been made, the value of 
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the database is lower the larger the investment. Example 3 illustrates how the results change 
when we take this possibility into account: 
Example 3 Assume that: 
• s = {I, 2} and A = {a}; 
• Only agent 1 can invest (X2 = 0); 
• Any agent can be allowed to control the asset; 
This is the same as example 1 except for the last assumption: we now assume that agent 
l's investment increases the value of the asset in the relationship (R'(Xl) > 0 as before), but 
reduces its outside value. With this assumption, we have 
Hence, agent 1 may actually have less incentives to invest when he controls the asset than 
when 2 does. This in fact is the case if 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) argue that a more accurate measure of power in the firm 
is the right to have access to critical resources. They point out that employees cannot 
undertake investments in firm-specific human capital unless they are allowed to operate the 
company's equipment, or to be exposed to the ideas of more senior colleagues or higher-
ranked employees. Thus, by regulating access to such critical resources (for example by 
allowing an employee to become familiar with the database), the firm can regulate the 
employees' ability to invest in human capital better than by distributing control rights. 
Formally, consider the following example: 





• S = {1,2,3} and A = {a}; 
• Agent 1 controls the asset; 
• Agents 2 and 3 can invest if allowed to by 1; 
• Coalitions have the following values: v( {I, 2, 3}, {a }IX2, X3) = R(X2, xs) - X2 - Xs, 
v({1,2},{a}lx2) = R(X2'0) - X2, v({1,3},{a}lxs) = R(O,xs) - X3, v({l},{a}) = 
rb where rl 2': 0 is a constant and R is increasing in its two arguments. And 
v( {2, 3}, 01x2, X3) = -X2 - Xs, v( {2}, 01x2) = -X2, and v( {3}, 0lxs) = -X3. 
Here, the owner of the asset can regulate access to it and in this way determine which 
employees invest and (within certain limits) how much. 
First of all, notice that when an employee is given access to an asset his incentives are 
never reduced: he can still choose not to invest. In contrast, there are cases where control 
does reduce the incentives (e.g. example 3). Thus access in this sense reflects better the 
idea that power generates incentives. Secondly, Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that the 
regulation of access can be a more useful instrument to generate incentives than the allocation 
of control, even in situations where control does motivate employees. Specifically, there are 
cases in which granting access to several employees generates strong competition and might 
allow the firm to induce first-best levels of investment by all the employees. 
One case where access can generate first-best investment levels is the one where the 
agents' investments enter the production function in an additive way: consider example 4 
with the following added assumption: 
where R' > 0 and R" < o. Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that with this kind of technology 
it is optimal for agent 1 to grant access to both employees (agents 2 and 3). Intuitively, the 
reason is that when only agent 2 has access, granting access to another employee (agent 3) 
generates a rat race which reduces agent 2's equilibrium payoff but increases the marginal 
return of his investment. This is due to the structure of the bargaining process, i. e. the use 
of the Shapley value: the Shapley value assigns to each agent the average of his marginal 
contributions to all possible coalitions, and therefore the size of an agent's investment de-
pends not only on the marginal return of the investment in the grand coalition, but also 
on the effect of his investment on the value of the smaller coalitions. However, when there 
are decreasing returns (R" < 0) and investments are additive, the marginal return of the 
investments is larger in the smaller coalitions than in the bigger ones. Therefore, when the 
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firm allows more agents to invest it "artificially" increases the marginal return of each indi-
vidual agent, In fact, with n agents and more restrictive assumptions about the production 
function there are cases in which the sum of investments is mono tonically increasing in n 
(however, there are also cases in which it is not). In general, the effectiveness with which 
access provides incentives depends both on the definition of the bargaining process and on 
the technology R(.). Take for example the case in which the investments are complements, 
i.e. R(X2' X3) satisfies 
In this case the marginal contributions to the small coalitions are smaller than the marginal 
contributions to the grand coalition, and it is optimal to grant access to one agent only. 
To sum up, under Rajan ad Zingales' (1998) assumptions, power is more effective as a 
mechanism to induce firm-specific human capital acquisition when it is conceived as access 
rather than control. 
3.3 Control versus Access 
However, Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Hart and Moore (1990) use different definitions of 
"specificity". Thus, the differences in their results are not solely attributable to differences 
between control and access, but also to different views about what it means for an investment 
to be specific. 
In Hart and Moore (1990), a specific investment Xi increases the value of all coalitions 
that i belongs to provided that such coalitions control the asset. More importantly, the 
investment does not reduce the value of any coalition: in particular, the outside value of i 
(the value of coalition {i}) does not depend on the size of his specific investment. In contrast, 
Rajan and Zingales' (1998) argument is that an investment which is really specific should 
reduce the outside value of employee i: when i's human capital is specialized in working with 
a particular group of employees, it should become less productive for other outside uses. 
This is a particularly reasonable assumption when i's investment specializes the asset (i.e. 
the investment is, at least partly, in physical capital), as in the database example. 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) also assume that specific investments have a negative effect 
on the outside value of an agent only if he controls the asset. Thus, suppose there were 
two employees, 1 and 2, and one asset, a, controlled by 2. Suppose both employees could 
make specific investments (Xl and X2)' According to their notion of specificity, the outside 
value of employee 2 (i. e. the value of coalition {2}) would be a decreasing function of 
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his specific investment, X2, but the outside value of employee 1 would not depend on his 
specific investment, Xl' When Xl is (at least partly) an investment in human capital, this 
is not a realistic assumption: in this case, the investment should reduce 1 's outside value 
independently of whether he does or does not control the asset. Thus, in the database 
example agent 1 spends time learning how to customize the database to make agent 2's work 
more efficient. But this time has an opportunity cost: agent 1 could use it to acquire general 
programming skills which would increase his outside value. If we take this cost into account, 
it would be more reasonable to assume that agent 1's investment reduces his outside value, 
even though he does not control the asset. This remark is important because then it would 
no longer be true that access would always increase the incentives to invest. 
3.4 Promotions 
The main point of the incomplete contracting literature is that organizations use the alloca-
tion of power as an imperfect substitute for an ideal contract where the employees' rewards 
would be made contingent on every possible state of the world. However, another reason why 
the allocation of power is a useful instrument in organizational design is that even in cases in 
which it would be possible to describe ex ante all the states of the world, it would be difficult 
to enforce such a contract. In the incomplete contracting literature, all difficulties related 
to contract enforcement (other than the difficulty to verify the state of the world) are put 
aside by assuming that all the surplus is divided through cooperative bargaining. However, 
when a firm is trying to design mechanisms to motivate employees to invest, enforcement is 
a real issue: by its nature, firm-specific human capital is hard to assess by third parties, and 
when workers have already invested, the firm could have an incentive to claim that the level 
of investment has not been adequate and refuse to reward them. On the other hand, even 
if the firm decided to be honest, workers could decide not to invest (or to invest too little) 
and then claim that they had. 
Prendergast (1993) has shown that a firm can use promotions to attenuate this double 
moral hazard problem. Suppose a risk-neutral firm employs a risk-neutral worker who, 
before being assigned to a job, can decide to invest in firm-specific human capital. Denote 
this investment by X E {O,1}. Suppose also that the firm can assign the worker to one of 
two jobs, denoted by i E {E, D}. Job E is an "easy" job, for which the worker's firm-specific 
human capital has little importance, and job D is a "difficult" job for which the fact that 
the worker has invested or not makes is important. Assignment to job D is a promotion in 
the sense that the job requires more human capital and is better paid. Specifically, consider 
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the following example: 
RD(O) < RE(O) < RE(l) < RD(l), 
where Ri (x) is the worker's output in job i when he has invested x. Under these assumptions 
it is efficient to assign to the easy job a worker that has not invested and to assign to the 
difficult job a trained worker. Because of the double moral hazard problem, an employment 
contract where the worker is given incentives to invest has to satisfy the following two 
incentive compatibility constraints: 
and 
WD - WE 2:: C, 
where Wi is the wage corresponding to job i and c is the cost incurred by the worker when 
making the investment. The first inequality ensures that it is profitable for the firm to 
promote the worker provided that he has invested; and the second one ensures that the 
worker is indeed willing to invest. 
First of all, notice that in order to induce the worker to invest the wage differential 
chosen by the firm (w D - WE) has to be large enough. However, the differential should not 
be too large because then the firm would not be willing to promote the worker even if he 
had invested. Thus, there exists a contract that induces the workers to invest (and the firm 
to promote) only as long as the inequality 
RD (l) - RE (l) 2:: c 
is satisfied. This means that a promotion can successfully induce specific human capital 
acquisition only if the worker is moved to a position where his newly acquired human 
capital makes him considerably more productive. In fact, suppose that WD > WE but 
RD (l) = RE (l), i.e. suppose that the firm offered simply a monetary reward for the in-
vestment; a promotion to a better paid position in which the worker's investment would not 
be particularly useful; or a mere change in the job title. Faced with this contract, the worker 
would not invest because he would anticipate that after his investment would have been 
made the firm would have an incentive to refuse to promote him. Fairburn and Malcomson 





to motivate employees. 
The use of promotions as an incentive device may conflict with its original function -to 
efficiently assign workers to tasks. Suppose that instead of one worker there is a continuum 
of workers with ability 'T] E (0,1), and redefine the production function as ~('T], x), with 
for every 'T] E (0,1), and 
Suppose also that ability is unknown when the workers decide to invest but becomes known 
after that. Prendergast (1993) shows that in this case there are production functions ~('T], x) 
such that the manager under-promotes. 
Fairburn and Malcomson (1995) use a very similar two-period model with a double moral 
hazard problem, but add a third party -the principal- with whom the manager and the 
promotion candidates sign a contract. The manager observes every candidate's performance, 
but the principal can only observe aggregate performance. As in Prendergast (1993), the 
manager decides who is promoted, but his compensation scheme is designed by the principal: 
the manager is no longer the residual claimant. Specifically, the principal can offer the 
manager an incentive contract which depends on aggregate performance, the number of 
employees promoted, and the wage attached to each position (i. e. all the variables observed 
both by the manager and the principal). The introduction of a third party changes the 
results: as I have mentioned, when the manager is the residual claimant, as in Prendergast 
(1995), and the promotion candidates are risk neutral, there is generally an inefficient task 
allocation or an inefficient level of effort. This is so because there is a trade-off between 
increasing the wage differential between tasks (which determines the promotion premium and 
therefore the candidates' levels of effort) and keeping the manager's incentives to promote the 
candidates he had promised to promote: the manager cannot increase the wage differential 
too much, because the candidates will not believe he is going to promote in the way he 
has stated. Now suppose we introduce a principal, and ·suppose that the principal offers a 
managerial compensation which does not depend on the candidates' wages but does depend 
on aggregate performance. Then managers will obviously choose the promotions efficiently. 
And given that promotions are been chosen efficiently, the principal can choose a high enough 
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wage differential to induce efficient effort. 
This result, however, relies on the assumption that employees are risk neutral. Suppose 
instead that they are risk averse. If performance is stochastic, the candidates for a promotion 
bear more risk the higher the wage differential, and this makes it more costly to induce first-
best effort, as in any moral hazard problem. Moreover, the promotion decision also affects the 
riskiness of the employees' wages: for example, if promotion is only given in case of extremely 
high performance, then employees know that it is very unlikely that they will be promoted 
and will bear very little risk, even if the wage differential is high. As a consequence, in 
the risk-averse case the principal uses both the wage differential and the promotion decision 
to provide employees with insurance, and this leads in general to inefficient promotions 
-under-promotion or over-promotion (Fairburn and Malcomson, 1995). 
4 The Exercise of Power in a Hierarchy 
Suppose now that there is no doubt about how the firm should allocate power among dif-
ferent employees. Suppose the firm is certain that a particular employee should be given 
more power. What instruments should he be allowed to use in order to exercise his power? 
How many subordinates should he have under his control? Should he encourage them to 
communicate with each other? Should he take their suggestions into account? Should he 
be allowed to decide about their pay? As these questions suggest, even after the firm has 
decided what employees should receive more power there are still many important choices to 
be made regarding the ways in which power is to be used. In this section I survey the main 
results in this direction. 
4.1 Tall versus Flat Hierarchies 
A first important decision is to choose between a hierarchy with many layers (a "tall" hi-
erarchy) and a hierarchy with a small number of layers (a "flat" hierarchy). Suppose the 
subordinates' actions are not perfectly observed by their superiors, as it often happens. 
When this is so, it would not be optimal for the firm to choose to have a very large number 
of hierarchical layers, because this would make it very costly to verify that the orders of top 
managers are being implemented at the lowest levels of the hierarchy. This idea was first 
introduced by Williamson (1967), and was further explored by Calvo and Wellisz (1978), 
and more recently by Qian (1994) (see also Keren and Levhari, 1979). Suppose the firm is 
a "tree-shaped" hierarchy where each employee monitors a number of direct subordinates, 





a way that it is costly to have subordinates do exactly what they have been asked to do. In 
this context, the firm can to a certain extent determine how much control is lost along the 
hierarchy by designing a few organizational characteristics: the total number of layers, the 
span of control (i. e. the number of direct subordinates controlled by each person in the firm), 
and the wage scales. For example, it is easier for a manager to monitor his subordinates 
if there are only a few. The above-mentioned papers analyze the optimal choice of these 
variables: in Williamson (1967), the firm chooses only the number of hierarchicallevelsj and 
in Calvo and Wellisz (1978) and Qian (1994) the firm is also allowed to choose the span of 
control and the wage scales. 
In a firm with a hierarchical structure, the intensity with which a manager monitors 
his direct subordinates has an effect on the effort of his indirect subordinates: if his direct 
subordinates are very closely monitored, they will try to work hard at their job, which 
includes monitoring their own direct subordinates. Therefore, the latter will also wok harder. 
Hence, the efficiency of the firm as a whole depends both on the number of direct subordinates 
that each employee has to monitorj and on the total number of hierarchical layers. For 
example, in a very fiat hierarchy very little control is lost across layers, because there are 
very few of them. But each layer contains a large number of employees, and this makes 
monitoring more costly. On the other hand, in a tall hierarchy it is easier for each employee 
to control his direct subordinates, but there are many layers across which control of the 
indirect subordinates is lost. Hence, when the total number of employees is fixed, there is a 
trade-off between reducing the cost of monitoring consecutive layers and reducing the cost 
of monitoring the whole organization (from the top to the bottom). In fiat hierarchies the 
latter is small, but the former is large. 
Qian (1994) shows that the optimal hierarchy is not degenerate: it is neither reduced 
to two layers, nor stretched to the point where every employee has only one subordinate. 
More interestingly, he shows that even when employees are identical ex ante (i. e. before 
they have been assigned to a position), it is optimal to give higher powered incentives to 
employees at higher positions. This is so because an increase in an employee's effort increases 
the marginal return of all his subordinates (both direct and indirect). Since it is cheaper 
for the firm to increase the incentives of a high ranked employee (because an increase in 
his effort increases the effort of all his subordinates) than to increase the incentives of all 
his subordinates, hierarchical power and incentives are positively correlated at the optimum. 
Finally, he shows that as the size of the firm, measured by the total number of employees, 
increases, the optimal number of layers increasesj the incentives given to top employees 
increasej and the incentives given to bottom employees diminish. 
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4.2 Cooperation, Collusion, and Competition between Subordi-
nates 
Another reason why managers lose control when hierarchies become large is that employees 
at different levels of the firm may find it profitable to agree between them on actions that are 
not beneficial to the firm as a whole. For example, a worker might do personal favors to his 
supervisor or offer him money in order to be recommended for a promotion. As the number 
of layers grows, so do these possibilities of collusion. However, side agreements between 
employees may also benefit the organization: for example, employees at different levels of 
the firm usually have access to different kinds of information which, put together, can greatly 
improve decision making. In these situations, the firm is better off letting employees make 
agreements, and it is more appropriate to speak of "cooperation" rather than collusion (see 
Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1990). In this section I begin by reviewing the costs and benefits 
of allowing subordinates to engage in side trade. After that, I discuss how the firm can limit 
the costs of side trade when it cannot enforce a prohibition. Finally, I discuss how power 
should be designed when subordinates compete with each other in a way that may harm the 
organization. 
4.2.1 The Costs and Benefits of Side Trade 
Suppose a manager could decide at no cost whether to allow his subordinates to communicate 
to each other and to sign side contracts. When would it be profitable for the manager to 
allow such agreements? 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990) have used the following model: suppose two agents 
(employees) work for the same principal (the manager), and suppose that the principal 
can observe the agents' efforts only imperfectly, whereas each agent can perfectly observe 
both his and his colleague's effort. Since agents perfectly observe each other's efforts, it is 
cheaper for them to insure each other than for the principal to insure them, because any 
insurance contract signed with the principal would be subject to a moral hazard problem. 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990) also show that when side trade is allowed the two agents 
behave like a single agent, i. e. like a syndicate. As a consequence, only aggregate incentives 
(the incentives for the two agents) matter. Because of better insurance, the principal can 
offer higher incentives to the syndicate than it would be profitable to offer to the two agents 
separately. On the other hand, side trade generates two important costs. First of all, when 
the agents choose their efforts cooperatively, relative performance evaluation becomes useless. 
Since the advantage of relative performance evaluation is to protect agents from risk (and 
in this way reduce the cost of incentives), the issue is whether a side contract insures agents 
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better than relative performance evaluation does. This depends on the degree of correlation 
between the two agents' outputs: if the correlation is low, relative performance evaluation 
does not insure well, and the principal should allow side trade. However, if the agents' 
outputs are very correlated it is better to forbid side trade and use relative performance 
evaluation instead. Secondly, suppose that the principal would like the agents to exert effort 
in different tasks but cannot observe what has been done on each task separately (as in 
Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). Then, when side contracting is allowed it is more costly to 
direct the agents' efforts to the appropriate tasks than when no side contracting is allowed: 
in the former case, each agent can not only choose how to distribute his effort among the 
various tasks assigned to him, but can also agree to participate on tasks that had been 
assigned to the other agent. Thus, the possibilities to engage in arbitrage across tasks are 
increased, and it is more costly to make sure that the agents divide their time between the 
various tasks in the way that the firm considers optimal. 
A different cost of side trade is that it takes time that employees could be spending 
on more productive activities. Milgrom (1988) has used this idea to analyze the costs and 
benefits of allowing subordinates to lobby. Lobbying, or "influence activities" , would benefit 
the firm if the lobbyists' suggestions enabled their superiors to improve decision making in a 
way that would compensate the time lost in lobbying. Hence Milgrom's (1988) main point: 
influence activities should be restricted when the lobbyists' aim is to induce changes that 
would cause little improvement in the performance of the firm (even if they would be of great 
importance to the lobbyists). In order to restrict influence activities, the firm should reduce 
the discretion of the supervisors, i.e. more decisions should be centralized. An interesting 
case in which employees have an incentive to spend time influencing their superiors with no 
advantage to the organization is the case where some jobs provide better opportunities to 
acquire general human capital than others. In this case, employees try to influence their 
superiors in order to be assigned to these jobs. However, the firm does not care about how 
these positions are allocated, because the returns from general human capital investments 
are completely captured by the employees. This creates some scope for employees to lobby. 
There is also some scope for lobbying when the manager who decides about a promotion 
does not fully internalize its cost (wage increase), as in Fairburn and Ma1comson (1995) (see 
section 3.4). 
Finally, another perverse effect of influence activities is that they limit the ability to 
agree on Pareto-improving actions within the organization. Rajan and Zingales (1997) have 
made this point in an incomplete contracting framework. Consider a set-up similar to that of 
section 3.1, with two parties, A and E, and two major changes: first of all, suppose that the 
parties can agree to undertake an action that would increase their joint surplus. The action 
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would actually reduce A's utility, but the increase in B's utility would be large enough to 
compensate A with a transfer. Secondly, assume that power is not contractible ex ante, but 
depends on the resources that each party devotes to influence activities (assume that the 
use of these resources is not contractible). Thus, after the parties have agreed to undertake 
the Pareto-improving action and B has compensated A with an appropriate transfer, both 
A and B can spend their resources in two different activities: a productive activity, which 
increases the size of the joint surplus, and an influence activity, which does not add anything 
to the surplus but increases the agent's share of it. Rajan and Zingales (1997) show that 
the Pareto-improving decision is not always undertaken because B is reluctant to transfer 
resources which A may use to increase her power. 
4.2.2 What To Do When Prohibitions Cannot Be Enforced 
When the agents' agreements harm the principal, the principal would in principle benefit from 
exercising all his power and forbidding side contracts, as in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990). 
However, this is usually costly. Consider for example the promotion example mentioned 
before. Even if the firm fears that the candidates for the promotion are going to bribe their 
supervisors in order to increase their chances, a mere prohibition is not always going to 
be effective: it is very difficult to control all personal favors or gifts and almost impossible 
to prove the motive. Being realistic, the firm has two solutions at hand. The first one is 
simply not to take into account the supervisors' opinions regarding the promotion. This 
is costly because supervisors, although potentially corrupt, have good information about 
their subordinates, and promotions would be more efficient if that information could be 
used. The second possibility is to take the supervisors' opinions into account and at the 
same time give them incentives not to accept bribes. The cost here is that the firm has 
to pay the supervisor more when he gives an unfavorable opinion about his subordinate to 
compensate for the bribes that he could earn if he lied and recommended his subordinate 
for the promotion. 
To see this, consider the following model from Tirole (1992). A principal (top manager) 
needs two persons in order to produce: a supervisor (manager), and an agent (low-level 
employee). The agent produces a unit of output for the principal and has private information 
about the cost of producing the unit, that we denote by c E {~, c}, where 0 ~ ~ < c. The 
marginal cost is low (c = ~) with probability a and high with probability I-a. The supervisor 
has more information about the marginal cost than the principal, but less than the agent: 
specifically, assume that before production takes place he learns a signal s E {~, 0}. Here 





assume that if e = f then s = f with probability (; and if e = c then s = 0 with probability 
1. Thus, when s = f the supervisor can either report the truth or lie pretending he has 
not learnt anything. The supervisor's report is denoted by r E {s, 0}. Assume also that 
everyone is risk neutral, with utilities U A = WA -ex for the agent, Us = Ws for the supervisor, 
and Up = Rx - WA - Ws for the principal. Here x E {D, I} denotes the probability that 
the agent produces the good and WA and Ws are the agent's and the supervisor's respective 
wages. Finally, consider the following timing: 
• t = 1: the agent learns e E {f, c} and the supervisor learns s E {f,0} (the agent learns 
s too); 
• t = 2: the principal offers a grand contract to the supervisor and the agent, which 
specifies WA, Ws and x as functions of the supervisor's report (r E {s, 0}); 
• t = 3: the supervisor and the agent can collude, i. e. sign a side contract which specifies 
a bribe as a function of the report made to the principal; 
• t = 4: the contracts are implemented. 
At the collusion stage (t = 3), we denote the bribe given by the agent to the supervisor by b. 
Since in this model collusion always harms the principal, we assume that bribes cannot be 
paid openly: the supervisor and the agent cannot rely on direct, visible monetary transfers. 
Specifically, assume that the supervisor only receives {3b, with D ~ {3 < 1, when the agent 
transfers b. 
In this firm, the power of the principal is restricted by his informational disadvantage: 
even though he can make a take-it-or-Ieave-it offer to his two subordinates, in practice his 
choice is limited by the possibility that they collude. Specifically, the principal has two 
options. The first one is to offer his subordinates a contract that does not depend on the 
supervisor's report. He can then pay the supervisor his reservation wage Ws = D and pay 
the agent WA = cor WA = f depending on whether 
(1) 
is satisfied or not (respectively). If WA = C, then both. types of agent (e = f and e = c) 
produce, and the principal's utility is given by the left-hand-side expression. In that case, 
the low-cost agent earns a rent !:le = c - f. On the other hand, if WA = f, then only 
the low-cost agent produces, and the principal's utility is measured by the right-hand-side 
expression. In any case, the grand contract is not contingent on the supervisor's report, and 
22 
,. , , 
as a consequence there is no scope for collusion. We may call this a bureaucratic contract, 
because the firm operates as if the supervisor and the agent had no discretion (see also 
Tirole, 1986): nothing they could suggest to the principal would change his decisions. 
The principal's second option is to offer an incentive contract, i. e. a contract which 
depends on the supervisor's report and which has been designed to induce him to report 
truthfully: in this case, the wages offered by the principal are functions of the supervisor's 
report. Use ws{r) and wA{r) to denote such functions. For truthful revelation, the principal 
has to give some rents to the supervisor to compensate him for the bribes he could get from 
the agent if he lied: in fact, if WA(£) = £ and WA(0) = c (which is optimal if (1) is satisfied), 
and ws(£) = ws(0), then the agent would be willing to pay a bribe b = !:l.c to the supervisor 
to convince him to lie when s = £. Hence an incentive compatible wage scheme for the 
supervisor would have to satisfy 
and the principal would choose ws(0) = 0 and ws(£) = (3!:l.c. To use Aghion and Tirole's 
(1997) terminology, in this case formal and real authoriy do not necessarily coincide: even 
though the principal has formal power (he can offer the contract he wishes), the supervisor 
can extract some rents. Specifically, when s = £ he has information that the principal is 
willing to pay for, and this enables him to capture an informational rent equal to (3!:l.c. 
This idea is found in many models of organizations where employees have asymmetric 
information. Thus, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990) show that it is optimal for a firm to 
constrain the amount of wages that a supervisor can pay to his subordinate when these two 
employees (supervisor and supervised) can collude. Such a constraint limits their gains from 
collusion, but also makes it more costly to induced effort from the supervised worker. Pren-
dergast and Topel (1996) also find that collusion leads to a more bureaucratic organizational 
design. 
4.2.3 What To Do When Employees Compete 
Competition between hierarchical levels is another possibility which organizations have to 
take into account when they decide how managers should exercise authority. Promotions 
generate this kind of competition when the skills of some employees are similar to their 
superior's: for example, suppose a manager is allowed to hire his subordinates. He may 
try to choose mediocre candidates if he is afraid that in the future he may lose his position 
and be replaced by one of them. Thus, Carmichael (1988) has argued that the main role 





budget of a department is fixed and in a particular year there are specially good candidates, 
then it would be optimal to replace senior professors with new junior professors. However, 
the university has to rely on senior professors to screen the candidates appropriately, and 
the former are not likely to choose the best candidates if they are afraid that they are 
going to take their jobs. A way to be sure that the incumbent professors hire the right 
candidates is to grant them lifetime employment, i.e. tenure. Friebel and Raith (1996) 
have argued that the practice of restricting communication between non-adjacent levels of 
the hierarchy ("skip-level" communication) plays a similar role: it protects employees from 
being replaced by their subordinates. Consider for example a three-level hierarchy with a 
principal, a supervisor, and an agent. Suppose the principal could replace the supervisor by 
the agent if he knew that the latter was more efficient, but is not able to find out. If skip-level 
communication is not allowed (i.e. the agent cannot communicate with the principal), the 
principal cannot learn that the agent is more efficient than the supervisor when this is true, 
because the supervisor has obviously no incentive to tell him. Thus, by restricting skip-level 
communication the firm could ensure proper hiring. 
4.3 Delegation 
The fact that subordinates have valuable private information explains why authority is often 
delegated, i. e. the employees who are formally in charge of making certain decisions do not 
exercise their right and simply rubber-stamp their subordinates' suggestions. Consider again 
Tirole's (1992) model of section 4.2.2. We argued that the principal could offer one of two 
contracts: a bureaucratic contract, where his subordinates' private information was not used; 
and an incentive contract, where the principal used that information and provided incentives 
to prevent lies. We did not mention a third possibility: to let his subordinates decide, i. e. 
to delegate. Principal-agent models usually ignore this third option because in many real 
situations wealth constraints make it unfeasible. However, when both the principal and the 
supervisor are managers of the same firm (the only difference being that one has more power 
than the other), there is no reason why the option of delegation should not be feasible. 
Aghion and Tirole (1997) have argued that an important benefit of delegation is that 
if subordinates know that their opinions are going to be heard, they exert more effort to 
try to find profitable projects to propose to their superiors. Thus, on one hand managers 
would like to exercise their formal power in order to make the decisions they personally 
prefer. But on the other hand they would like to be able to count on their subordinates 
in those cases where they think the latter might be better informed. In order to motivate 
their subordinates, managers have to assure them that their opinions are going to be taken 
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into account: if subordinates think that their managers are going to decide by themselves, 
they will not make any effort to have an informed opinion. Thus the issue is how to exercise 
. authority without demotivating one's subordinates. Aghion and Tirole analyze several ways 
in which managers can commit to listen to their subordinates and hence encourage their 
initiative. One way to create this commitment is to overload managers with tasks: by doing 
so, the firm ensures that, not having enough time to decide about all problems, managers 
ask their subordinates for suggestions. For similar reasons, more urgent decisions are more 
usually delegated: if a manager is regularly faced with decisions which require a quick answer, 
he is likely to encourage his subordinates to give their opinions. 
5 Alternative Views 
5.1 The Benefits of Leadership 
A "leader" induces others to voluntarily follow his recommendations. In this sense, leadership 
is equivalent to the notion of authority discussed in section 2, and different from the notion 
of power we have been using throughout the paper. In fact, in any standard agency model 
of the type discussed in section 4 subordinates reveal their information (or choose their 
effort) voluntarily once their superior has designed the appropriate incentive mechanism: in 
equilibrium all actions are voluntary. But this description of leadership is not satisfactory, 
because the superior "buys" his subordinates' actions: instead, the intuitive idea of a leader 
is that of someone who has the ability to convince others to carry out certain actions or, in 
other words, the ability to change their objectives. 
In Hermalin's (1997) model, the leader's ability to convince other members of his team 
comes from the fact that he has better information than every other member about the 
marginal return of effort. He defines the firm as a team of N workers with a production 
function V = ° L ei, where ei is agent i's effort. Contracts can be made contingent on the 
team output, V, but not on the individual effort choices. Moreover, the marginal return 
of effort, 0, is observed only by one of the team members, agent N (the leader). Hence, 
the optimal contract has to solve two problems at the same time: a moral hazard in teams 
problem (as in Holmstrom, 1982)' and an adverse selection problem. 
Hermalin (1997) compares two kinds of contracts. The first one is a mechanism in which 
the informed agent sends a message {) to his teammates which truthfully reveals 0, and after 
that every team member chooses an effort level. Among all the contracts of this kind, the 
optimal one induces truthful revelation by making the informed agent's reward a decreasing 
function of his message, {). This is needed for incentive compatibility because otherwise 
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agent N would have an incentive to claim that () is very high so that everyone else exerts a 
lot of effort. For example, every time a new project is undertaken the manager would have 
an incentive to tell his subordinates that the project is extremely important to the firm. In 
order for the subordinates to believe him, it should be costly for the manager to make such 
statements. Hermalin calls this property "leader sacrifice". The second class of contracts 
are mechanisms in which the informed agent chooses his effort before anyone else, and his 
teammates observe this choice and then choose their own efforts. In this case, the informed 
agent "leads by example": to make his teammates believe that () is high, he chooses a high 
level of effort. The subordinates believe the manager's statement that the project is very 
important because they see him stay in the office late in the evenings. 
Hermalin (1997) proves that with the latter contract the team can attain the same level 
of output that it would be able to produce if there was symmetric information about the 
marginal return of effort (i. e. all teammates knew ()). To understand why this is possible, 
consider the case in which () is known by everyone, but it is still,the case that contracts 
can only be contingent on team output, V, and not on the individual levels of effort of the 
team members. The (second-best, since the team problem remains) optimal contract is a 
"shares contract" where every agent gets a share 1/ N of every additional unit of team output 
and where the levels of the agents' rewards are adjusted through lump-sum transfers, which 
redistribute the surplus without affecting its size. Now suppose that there is asymmetric 
information about (). The lump-sum transfers can be made contingent on the message B in 
order to induce truthful revelation without reducing the size of the surplus. The contract 
obtained in this way is the "leader sacrifice" contract. 
On the other hand, consider the "leading by example" type of contract. In this case, 
truthful revelation requires the leader to exert "too much" effort (compared with the sym-
metric information case) when () is high in order to convince his teammates that () really 
is high. As a consequence, the need to truthfully reveal () increases the size of the surplus: 
the manager works extra hours to have his subordinates believe him. In contrast, under the 
"leader sacrifice" contract the need to truthfully reveal () just changed the distribution of 
the surplus, without increasing the size. This explains why leading by example, then, is a 
better mechanism to induce effort in the team. 
5.2 The Benefits of Power Struggles 
In section 4 we assumed that a firm would ideally like to distribute authority in a way that all 
employees' incentives are aligned. Dewatripont and Tirole (1995) have questioned this idea, 
pointing out that many organizations do not design incentives in that way, but deliberately 
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ask employees to defend narrow, conflicting objectives. For example, a department in the 
firm is asked to control other departments' expenses, while another department is asked to 
propose new investment projects. 
The main advantage of having interest groups or advocates of specific causes fight to 
influence the organization is that in this way employees have more incentives to gather 
information. Suppose the top management is deb~ting whether to carry out a particular 
investment project, and suppose also that there is not enough information at present to know 
whether the project will be worthwhile. If a single person is entrusted to gather information 
to help the organization decide, she might be afraid to find out that, after hours of work 
on the subject, there are still as many reasons to recommend the project as to disapprove 
it. Hence, if the organization can only provide rewards contingent on the decision made, 
and not on the quality of the information povided by the subordinate, the subordinate will 
have low incentives to find out new information which could counterbalance the information 
she already has. On the contrary, when the organization uses two different employees to 
find out the costs and benefits of the project, each employee can only increase her reward 
by looking for more information than the one she already has: having better information 
always increases her chances of defending her view better than the other employee. 
6 Conclusions 
Throughout the paper I have emphasized two questions: which employees should have more 
power? and: what mechanisms should a firm design to ensure that those with power use 
it efficiently? Regarding the first question, the literature has emphasized the effects of the 
allocation of power on the employees' investments in firm-specific human capital. According 
to this view, firms should think of power as a protection against opportunistic behavior and 
before allocating power should decide which employees are likely to make the most valuable 
investments in human capital. As far as the second question is concerned, the literature has 
emphasized that different forms of power generate different interactions between hierarchical 
layers --cooperation, collusion, or competition. The importance of these interactions, in 
turn, depends on the asymmetries of information among employees. Thus a second factor 
that firms should take into account when they design their structures of power is the value 
of each subordinate's information. When the value is very high, the firm should encourage 
managers to delegate their power. If this is too costly, then the firm should design mecha-
nisms which motivate subordinates to reveal their information truthfully instead of using it 
to attain their own private objectives. 
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Clearly, it is artificial to separate the two questions. If a firm is very bureaucratic and 
leaves very little discretion to a manager, then this manager has little effective power, even 
if he occupies a very high position in the hierarchy of the firm. As a consequence, we 
should expect him to invest very little in firm-specific human capital. On the other hand, 
suppose a firm is re-allocating power and has decided that a particular employee should 
receive more authority. At that point, the firm has still to decide what specific decisions the 
employee is going to be allowed to make. For example, it may be that it is profitable to 
allow this employee to use a part of the budget, but unprofitable to allow him to choose what 
subordinates to hire. From an incomplete contracting point of view, both rights ultimately 
stem from a right of control over the firm's assets. However, they can have very different 
consequences. 
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